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Abstract. We consider an extension of the popular matching problem
in this paper. The input to the popular matching problem is a bipartite
graph G = (A∪B, E), where A is a set of people, B is a set of items, and
each person a ∈ A ranks a subset of items in an order of preference, with
ties allowed. The popular matching problem seeks to compute a matching
M∗ between people and items such that there is no matching M where
more people are happier with M than with M∗. Such a matching M∗
is called a popular matching. However, there are simple instances where
no popular matching exists.
Here we consider the following natural extension to the above problem:
associated with each item b ∈ B is a non-negative price cost(b), that
is, for any item b, new copies of b can be added to the input graph by
paying an amount of cost(b) per copy. When G does not admit a popular
matching, the problem is to “augment” G at minimum cost such that
the new graph admits a popular matching. We show that this problem
is NP-hard; in fact, it is NP-hard to approximate it within a factor of√
n1/2, where n1 is the number of people. This problem has a simple
polynomial time algorithm when each person has a preference list of
length at most 2. However, if we consider the problem of constructing a
graph at minimum cost that admits a popular matching that matches all
people, then even with preference lists of length 2, the problem becomes
NP-hard. On the other hand, when the number of copies of each item is
fixed, we show that the problem of computing a minimum cost popular
matching or deciding that no popular matching exists can be solved in
O(mn1) time, where m is the number of edges.
1 Introduction
The popular matching problem deals with matching people to items, where each
person ranks a subset of items in an order of preference, with ties allowed. The
input is a bipartite graph G = (A∪ B, E) where A is the set of people, B is the
set of items and the edge set E = E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Er (Ei is the set of edges of rank
i). For any a ∈ A, we say a prefers item b to item b′ if the rank of edge (a, b) is
smaller than the rank of edge (a, b′). If the ranks of (a, b) and (a, b′) are the same,
⋆ This work was done as part of the DST-MPG partner group “Efficient Graph Algo-
rithms”.
then a is indifferent between b and b′. The goal is to match people with items
in an optimal manner, where the definition of optimality will be a function of
the preferences expressed by the elements of A. The problem of computing such
an optimal matching is a well studied problem and several notions of optimality
have been considered so far; for instance, pareto-optimality [1], rank-maximality
[4], and fairness.
One criterion that does not use the absolute values of the ranks is the notion
of popularity. Let M(a) denote the item to which a person a is matched in a
matching M . We say that a person a prefers matching M to M ′ if (i) a is
matched in M and unmatched in M ′, or (ii) a is matched in both M and M ′,
and a prefers M(a) to M ′(a).
Definition 1. M is more popular than M ′, denoted by M ≻M ′, if the number
of people who prefer M to M ′ is higher than those that prefer M ′ to M . A
matching M∗ is popular if there is no matching that is more popular than M∗.
Popular matchings were first introduced by Ga¨rdenfors [3] in the context of
stable matchings for two-sided preference lists (here both sides of the graph G
express preferences). In the domain of one-sided preference lists, popular match-
ings can be considered to be stable as no majority vote of people can force
a migration to another matching; also, popularity is based on relative ranking
rather than the actual ranks used by people. These properties make popularity
a desirable notion of optimality in the domain of one-sided preferences.
On the flip side, popularity does not provide a complete answer since there
exist simple instances that do not admit any popular matching. An example is
the following: let A = {a1, a2, a3}, B = {b1, b2, b3}, and each person ai, for i =
1, 2, 3, prefers b1 to b2, and b2 to b3. Consider the three symmetrical matchings
M1 = {(a1, b1), (a2, b2), (a3, b3)}, M2 = {(a1, b3), (a2, b1), (a3, b2)} and M3 =
{(a1, b2), (a2, b3), (a3, b1)}. None of these matchings is popular, since M1 ≺M2,
M2 ≺ M3, and M3 ≺ M1. Abraham et al. [2] designed efficient algorithms for
determining if a given instance admits a popular matching and computing one,
if it exists.
The fact that popular matchings do not always exist has motivated several
extensions to the popular matching problem. McCutchen [10] considered the
problem of computing a least unpopular matching; he considered two measures
of unpopularity and showed that computing a matching that minimized either of
these measures is NP-hard. Kavitha et al. [5] generalized the notion of popularity
to mixed matchings or probability distributions over matchings and showed that
a popular mixed matching always exists.
Our problem. Here we consider another natural generalization to the popular
matching problem: augment the input graph G such that the new graph admits
a popular matching. Our input consists of G = (A ∪ B, E) and a function cost :
B → R+, where cost(b) for any b ∈ B is the cost of making a new copy of item
b. The set B is a set of items, say books or DVDs, and new copies of any b ∈ B
can be obtained by paying cost(b) for each new copy of b. There is no restriction
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on the number of copies of any item that can be made. The only criterion that
we seek to optimize is the total cost of augmenting G.
Going to back to the earlier example on 3 people and 3 items that did not
admit a popular matching, it is easy to show that by making a new copy of either
b1 or b2, the resulting graph admits a popular matching. In order to minimize
the cost, we will make a new copy of that item in {b1, b2} which has lower cost.
Our starting graph G = (A∪ B, E) comes for free, every addition that we make
to G comes at a price and our goal is to make these additions such that the new
graph admits a popular matching and the total cost of additions is minimized.
We call this the min-cost augmentation problem.
A related problem. A related problem is the following: we do not have a
starting graph G. We are given a set A of people and their preference lists over
a universe U of items where each item b ∈ U has a price cost(b) ≥ 0 associated
with it. The problem is to “construct” an input graph G = (A ∪ B, E) where B
is a multiset of some elements in U such that G admits a popular matching and
the cost of constructing G, that is,
∑
b∈B cost(b), is as small as possible. Here we
also have an extra condition that the popular matching should leave no person
unmatched, otherwise we have a trivial solution of B = ∅. We call this problem
the min-cost popular instance problem.
The above problem can also be regarded as a “gift buying” problem. Each
person in A has a preference list over gifts that she would like to receive. The
problem is to buy a gift for each person in A with the total cost as small as
possible and assign each person a gift such that this assignment is popular. That
is, there is no reassignment of gifts that makes more people happier. This is the
min-cost popular instance problem.
1.1 Our Results
We show the following results in this paper:
1. The min-cost popular instance problem is NP-hard, even when each prefer-
ence list has length at most 2 (i.e., every person has a top choice item and
possibly, a second choice item).
2. The min-cost augmentation problem has a polynomial time algorithm when
each preference list has length at most 2 .
3. The min-cost augmentation problem is NP-hard for general lists. In fact,
it is NP-hard to approximate to within a factor of
√
n1/2, where n1 is the
number of people.
All our NP-hardness results hold even when preference lists are derived from
a master list. A master list is a total ordering of the items according to some
global objective criterion. Thus if b1 precedes b2 in the master list and if a person
a has both b1 and b2 in her list, then it has to be the case that b1 precedes b2 in
a’s list.
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We would like to contrast the NP-hardness of the min-cost augmentation
problem with the problem of determining a popular matching with variable job
capacities [7]. In this problem the input is a graph G = (A∪B, E) where A is a
set of people and B is a set of jobs, we are also given a list 〈c1, . . . , c|B|〉 denoting
upper bounds on the capacities of each job. The problem is to determine if
there exists (x1, . . . , x|B|) such that for each i, setting the capacity of the i-th
job to xi, where 1 ≤ xi ≤ ci, enables the resulting graph to admit a popular
matching. This problem was shown to be NP-hard in [7]; however note that here
the capacity of each job has an upper bound. Instead, if we only had to maintain
an overall upper bound on the total increase of capacities rather than individual
upper bounds, a simple polynomial time algorithm solves this problem [7].
In the min-cost augmentation problem recall that there is no upper bound on
the amount that we can spend on a particular item. What we seek to optimize
is the overall cost and this problem is NP-hard. Note that when each item has
the same cost, then this problem can be solved in polynomial time (using the
above algorithm from [7]). However when the costs come from {1, 2} the problem
becomes NP-hard.
The NP-hardness results for the min-cost augmentation/min-cost popular
instance problems are because the number of copies of each of the items need to
be determined so as to ensure the existence of a popular matching at minimum
cost. Let copies(b) for any item b ∈ B denote the number of copies of item b in
our graph G. We now consider the following problem: each b ∈ B has a fixed
number of copies denoted by copies(b) and let the cost of a matching M be the
sum of costs of items that are matched in M (we have to pay a cost of k.cost(b)
if k copies of item b are used in M , where k ≤ copies(b)). Our final result is a
polynomial time algorithm for the min-cost popular matching problem which we
define below.
∗ The min-cost popular matching problem is to determine if G admits a pop-
ular matching or not and if so, to compute the one with minimum cost.
We show that this problem can be solved in O(mn1) time, where m is the
number of edges and n1 is the number of people. Manlove and Sng consid-
ered this problem without costs in the context of House Allocation. There
items were called houses and copies of items as in our case were represented
using capacities for houses. They called it Capacitated House Allocation
with Ties (CHAT) and the problem was to determine if G admits a popular
matching or not, and if so, to compute one. Manlove and Sng [9] showed an
O((
√
C + n1)m) algorithm for the CHAT problem, where C is the sum of
capacities of all items. Thus, our algorithm improves upon the algorithm in
[9].
1.2 Background
Abraham et al. [2] considered the problem of determining if a given graph G =
(A ∪ B, E) admits a popular matching or not, and if so, computing one. They
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also gave a structural characterization of graphs that admit popular matchings.
Section 2 outlines this characterization and the algorithm that follows from it.
Subsequent to this work, several variants of the popular matchings problem
have been considered. One line of research has been on generalizations of the
popular matchings problem while the other direction has been to deal with in-
stances that do not admit any popular matchings. The generalizations include
the capacitated version studied by Manlove and Sng [9], the weighted version
studied by Mestre [12] and random popular matchings studied by Mahdian [8].
Kavitha and Nasre [6] as well as McDermind and Irving [11] independently stud-
ied the problem of computing an optimal popular matching for strict instances
where the notion of optimality is specified as a part of the input. Note that they
also considered the min-cost popular matchings but in this version the costs are
associated with edges whereas in our problem costs are associated with items.
As described earlier, the line of research pursued for instances that do not admit
popular matchings includes the NP-hardness of least unpopular matchings [10],
the existence and algorithms for popular mixed matchings [5] and NP-hardness
of the popular matchings problem with variable job capacities [7].
Organization of the paper. Section 2 discusses preliminaries. Section 3 shows that
the min-cost popular instance problem is NP-hard. Section 4 has our results for
the min-cost augmentation problem and Section 5 has our algorithm for the
min-cost popular matching problem.
2 Preliminaries
We review the characterization of popular matchings given in [2]. Let G1 =
(A ∪ B, E1) be the graph containing only rank-1 edges. Then [2, Lemma 3.1]
shows that a matchingM is popular in G only ifM∩E1 is a maximum matching
of G1. Maximum matchings have the following important properties, which we
use throughout the rest of the paper.
M∩E1 defines a partition of A∪B into three disjoint sets: a vertex u ∈ A∪B
is even (resp. odd) if there is an even (resp. odd) length alternating path in G1
(w.r.t. M ∩E1) from an unmatched vertex to u. Similarly, a vertex u is unreach-
able if there is no alternating path from an unmatched vertex to u. Denote by
E , O and U the sets of even, odd, and unreachable vertices, respectively.
Lemma 1 (Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition). Let E, O and U be the sets
of vertices defined by G1 and M ∩E1 above. Then
(a) E, O and U are pairwise disjoint, and independent of the maximum matching
M ∩ E1.
(b) In any maximum matching of G1, every vertex in O is matched with a vertex
in E, and every vertex in U is matched with another vertex in U . The size
of a maximum matching is |O|+ |U|/2.
(c) No maximum matching of G1 contains an edge between a vertex in O and
a vertex in O ∪ U . Also, G1 contains no edge between a vertex in E and a
vertex in E ∪ U .
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Since every maximum cardinality matching in G1 matches all vertices u ∈
O ∪ U , these vertices are called critical as opposed to vertices u ∈ E which are
called non-critical. Using this partition of vertices, the following definitions can
be made.
Definition 2. For each a ∈ A, define f(a) to be the set of top choice items for
a. Define s(a) to be the set of a’s most-preferred non-critical items in G1.
Theorem 1 (from [2]). A matching M is popular in G iff (i) M ∩ E1 is a
maximum matching of G1 = (A ∪ B, E1), and (ii) for each person a, M(a) ∈
f(a) ∪ s(a).
The algorithm for solving the popular matching problem is now straightforward:
each a ∈ A determines the sets f(a) and s(a). A matching that is maximum in
G1 and that matches each a to an item in f(a) ∪ s(a) needs to be determined.
If no such matching exists, then G does not admit a popular matching.
3 Min-cost Popular Instance
In this section we consider the min-cost popular instance problem. Our input is
a set A of people where each a ∈ A has a preference list over items in a universe
U , where each item b ∈ U has a price cost(b) ≥ 0. The problem is to “construct”
a graph G or equivalently, set suitable values for copies(b) where b ∈ U , in order
to ensure that the resulting graph G admits a popular matching that matches
all a ∈ A, at the least possible cost.
We will show that the above problem is NP-hard by showing a reduction
from the monotone 1-in-3 SAT problem to this problem. The monotone 1-in-
3 SAT problem is a variant of the 3SAT problem where each clause contains
exactly 3 literals and no literal appears in negated form. The monotone 1-in-3
SAT problem asks if there exists a satisfying assignment to the variables such
that each clause has exactly 1 literal set to true. This problem is NP-hard [13].
Let I be an instance of the monotone 1-in-3 SAT problem. Let C1, . . . , Cm
be the clauses in I and let X1, . . . , Xn be the variables in I. We construct from
I an instance of the min-cost popular instance problem as follows:
Corresponding to each clause Ci = (Xj1 ∨ Xj2 ∨ Xj3), we have 9 people
Ai = {ai1 . . . , ai9}. Their preference lists are shown in Fig. 1. In this case every
person has a preference list of length 2, that is a top item followed by a second
choice item. For instance, ai1 treats item uj1 as its rank-1 item and item uj2 as
its rank-2 item.
The items uj1 , uj2 , uj3 are called public items and the items p
i
1, p
i
2, p
i
3, and
qi are called internal items. The internal items appear only on the preference
lists of the people of Ai while the public items also appear on the preference
lists of people in Ai as well as outside Ai. The public item uj corresponds to the
variable Xj . In every clause Ci that Xj belongs to, the item uj appears in the
preference lists of some of the people in the set Ai as shown in Fig. 1.
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ai1 uj1 uj2
ai2 uj2 uj3
ai3 uj1 uj3
ai4 uj1 p
i
1
ai5 uj2 p
i
2
ai6 uj3 p
i
3
ai7 p
i
1 q
i
ai8 p
i
2 q
i
ai9 p
i
3 q
i
Fig. 1. The preference lists of people corresponding to the i-th clause in I.
The set A of people in our instance is ∪iAi. The universe U of all items is
the union of {u1, . . . , un} (the n public items) and the set ∪i{pi1, pi2, pi3, qi} of all
the internal items. It remains to describe the costs of the items. For each i, the
cost of each pit for t = 1, 2, 3, is 1 unit, while the cost of q
i is zero units. The cost
of each uj , for j = 1, . . . , n, is 3 units.
Recall that our problem is to determine a set B of items with suitable copies
so that the graph (A∪B, E) admits a popular matching that matches all a ∈ A
and we want to do this at the least possible cost. We first show the following
lemma.
Lemma 2. Any instance (A∪B, E) that admits a popular matching that matches
all a ∈ A has cost at least 14m.
Proof. Let us focus on the set Ai of people corresponding to clause Ci. The
preference lists of people in Ai are shown in Fig. 1. Since the cost of each item
on the lists of ai1, a
i
2, a
i
3 is 3, we have to spend 9 units to buy an item each for
these 3 people (since we seek an instance where all the persons get matched).
People ai4, a
i
5, a
i
6 have a unit cost item in their preference lists (items p
i
1, p
i
2, p
i
3,
respectively). Thus, we have to spend 3 units to buy an item each for these
3 people. Finally, ai7, a
i
8, a
i
9 have a cost 0 item, i.e. q
i, in their preference lists.
Hence, we can get qi with copies(qi) = 3 for a cost of 0. Summarizing, we need
to spend at least 9 + 3 + 0 = 12 units for the people in Ai.
However, it is not possible to spend just 12 units for the people in Ai. This is
because, in the first place, we are forced to have non-zero copies for at least 2 of
the 3 items in {uj1 , uj2 , uj3} and if we seek to match ai4 to pi1 while uj1 is around,
then pi1 is a
i
4’s second choice item. Since p
i
1 is a
i
7’s top choice item, we also have
to match ai7 to p
i
1 since a popular matching has to be a maximum cardinality
matching on rank-1 edges (see Theorem 1). Thus, it is not possible to match
ai7 to q
i in a popular matching while pi1 gets matched to a
i
4 who regards this
item as a second choice item because uj1 is around.
4 Thus we have the following
options:
(i) set copies(uj1) = 0 and then match a
i
4 to p
i
1 and a
i
7 to q
i
(ii) match both ai4 and a
i
7 to p
i
1 by setting copies(p
i
1) = 2
(iii) add one more copy of uj1 and set copies(p
i
1) = 0 and thus match a
i
4 to uj1
and ai7 to q
i
4 A matching that contains the 3 edges (ai1, u
i
j1
), (ai4, p
i
1), (a
i
7, q
i) cannot be popular
since by promoting ai7 from q
i to pi1, and a
i
4 from p
i
1 to uj1 , and leaving a
i
1 unmatched,
we get a more popular matching.
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It is not possible to have option (i) for all the uj ’s since we are forced to have
non-zero copies for at least 2 of the 3 items in {uj1 , uj2 , uj3}. Note that (ii) is
always better than (iii) (cost of 2 units vs cost of 3 units). Hence it is always
cheaper to match ai4, a
i
5, a
i
6 to p
i
1, p
i
2, p
i
3 respectively than to any of uj1 , uj2 , uj3 .
Thus, when we match ai4, a
i
5, a
i
6 to p
i
1, p
i
2, p
i
3 respectively, at least 2 of these
3 people are getting matched to their second choice items. Hence, at least 2 out
of the 3 people among ai7, a
i
8, a
i
9 will also have to be matched to their top choice
items in order to ensure that the resulting matching is popular. This implies a
cost of at least 9 + 3 + 2 = 14 for Ai.
This holds for each Ai, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Since the cost is at least 14 per
clause, it amounts to at least 14m in total for all the clauses. ⊓⊔
The following lemma establishes the correspondence between the instance I
of monotone 1-in-3-SAT and the min-cost popular instance that we defined.
Lemma 3. There exists an instance (A ∪ B, E) with cost 14m that admits a
popular matching that matches all a ∈ A iff there exists a 1-in-3 satisfying
assignment for I.
Proof. We know from Lemma 2 that any instance (A ∪ B, E) that admits a
popular matching that matches all a ∈ A has a cost of at least 14m. What we
need to show here is that (A∪B, E) has cost 14m if and only if the 1-in-3-SAT
instance I is a “yes” instance, that is, there is a true/false assignment to the
variables X1, . . . , Xn such that each clause has exactly 1 literal set to true (and
thus 2 literals set to false).
Suppose I admits such an assignment. We now show how to construct a set
B of cost 14m such that the instance (A∪B, E) admits a popular matching that
matches all a ∈ A. If Xi = true then set copies(ui) = 0, else copies(ui) will be
set to a suitable strictly positive value.
Since the setting of true/false values to Xi’s is a satisfying assignment, every
clause has two literals set to false and 1 set to true. Let clause Ci be (Xj1 ∨
Xj2 ∨ Xj3). Thus there is 1 variable Xjk in {Xj1 , Xj2 , Xj3} that has been set
to true. By our definition of copies of every item, the corresponding ujk has 0
copies. Hence the people in the set Ai can be matched as follows:
– ai1, a
i
2, a
i
3 get matched to the 2 items in {uj1 , uj2 , uj3} \ {ujk} by having 2
copies of one of the lower indexed item and 1 copy of the higher indexed
item for these 3 people.
– pik becomes a
i
k+3’s top choice item (since ujk does not exist in the graph
now) and hence we can now match aik+3 to p
i
k and a
i
k+6 to q
i.
This way we spend only 9 + 3 + 2 = 14 units for the people in Ai and each
person a has an item in f(a) ∪ s(a) to be matched to. Since every clause in I
has exactly 1 variable set to true and 2 set to false, we achieve a cost of 14 for
each set Ai. This shows that we can construct a set B of cost 14m such that
(A ∪ B, E) admits a popular matching that matches all a ∈ A.
To show the other direction, let us set the true/false values of variables in I
as follows: for each j = 1, . . . , n set Xj = true if and only if copies(uj) = 0. We
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need to show that such an assignment sets exactly 1 variable in each clause to
be true.
Let us consider any clause Ci = (Xj1 ∨ Xj2 ∨ Xj3). Among the 3 items
uj1 , uj2 , uj3 that correspond to these 3 variables we need at least 2 items to have
non-zero copies so as to match all the 3 people ai1, a
i
2, a
i
3. Thus, our true/false
assignment does not set more than 1 variable per clause to true.
We now need to show that there is at least 1 item in {uj1 , uj2 , uj3} with zero
copies. This is where we will use the hypothesis that we can construct (A∪B, E)
of cost 14m that admits a popular matching that matches all a ∈ A. It follows
from the proof of Lemma 2 that each set Ai of people corresponding to a clause
needs a cost of at least 14. Since the total cost is only 14m and there are m
clauses, this implies that we have to spend exactly 14 per clause. In other words,
the items for the 9 people of each Ai have to be bought using only 14 units.
If all the 3 items in {uj1 , uj2 , uj3} have non-zero copies, then this implies the
cost of items for all the 9 people in Ai will be 9 + 3 + 3 = 15 since when each
ujk has at least one copy, then the ujk ’s become top choice items for a
i
4, a
i
5, a
i
6,
respectively and thus pi1, p
i
2, p
i
3 become their second choice items. This forces us
to match each of ai7, a
i
8, a
i
9 to their top choice items (that is, p
i
1, p
i
2, p
i
3, respec-
tively) since a popular matching has to be a maximum cardinality matching on
rank-1 edges. However, we are given that we can spend only 14 units per Ai;
thus it has to be the case that there exists at least 1 item in {uj1 , uj2 , uj3} which
has zero copies. This finishes the proof of this lemma. ⊓⊔
Note that the preference lists of all the people in our instance G are strict
and of length at most 2. Also, the preference lists are drawn from a master list.
We have thus shown the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The min-cost popular instance problem is NP-hard, even when
each preference list has length at most 2. Further, the hardness holds even when
the preference lists are derived from a master list.
4 Min-cost Augmentation
In this section we show various results for the min-cost augmentation problem.
Recall that the input here is a graph G = (A ∪ B, E) where each item b ∈ B
has a non-negative cost(b) associated with it. The problem is to determine how
to make extra copies of items in B so that the resulting graph admits a popular
matching and the cost of the extra copies is minimized.
Unlike the min-cost popular instance problem, the above problem admits a
simple polynomial time algorithm when each a ∈ A has a preference list that
is strict and of length at most 2. We describe this algorithm below. We assume
throughout this section that we add at the end of each a’s preference list a
dummy item called the last item ℓa, where a being matched to ℓa amounts to a
being left unmatched.
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4.1 Preference lists of length 2
For any a ∈ A, a’s preference list consists of a top choice item (let us use fa to
denote this item), and possibly a second choice item (let us use za to denote this
item) and then of course, the last item ℓa that we added for convenience. Let
G1 be the graph G restricted to rank-1 edges. Let the graph G
′ = (A ∪ B, E′),
where E′ consists of
– all the top ranked edges (a, fa): one such edge for each a ∈ A, and
– the edges (a, sa), where a is even in G1 and sa is a’s most preferred item
that is even in G1. Thus sa = za when za is nobody’s top choice item, else
sa = ℓa.
It follows from Theorem 1 that G admits a popular matching if and only if
G′ admits an A-perfect matching. We assume that G does not admit a popular
matching and we have to decide now which items should be duplicated and how
many extra copies should be made. Since G′ does not admit a popular matching,
there exists a set S of people such that the neighborhoodN(S) of S in G′ satisfies
|N(S)| < |S|. Let S denote a minimal such set of people. It is easy to see that
every a ∈ S must be even in G1. Thus, for each a ∈ S, the edge (a, sa) belongs
to G′ and it must be that sa = za. Otherwise sa = ℓa and since no vertex in
A other than a has an edge to ℓa, such an a will be always matched in any
maximum cardinality matching in G′. Hence, such an a cannot belong to S due
to its minimality. Further note that for any such minimal set S, the set N(S)
is a set of items that are all odd in the graph G′ with respect to a maximum
cardinality matching in G′.
Since sa = za for every a ∈ S, and the preference lists are of length at most
2, there are no items sandwiched between f(a) and s(a) in a’s preference list
for every a ∈ S. Thus, in order to ensure that these people get matched in any
popular matching, we need to make extra copies of items in N(S) or equivalently
items that are odd in the graphG′. Our algorithm precisely does this and in order
to get a min-cost augmentation, it chooses the odd item in G′ which has least
cost. The steps of our algorithm are described in Algorithm 1.
Our algorithm maintains the invariant that no person a changes her s-item
due to the increase in copies. This is because we ensure that no top choice item
b ever becomes even in H1i , the graph Hi restricted to rank-1 edges. Note that
the set of odd items in Hi is identified by constructing alternating paths from a
person who is unmatched in Hi and every item b that appears on such a path is
always odd. Further, our duplications ensure that the total number of copies of
an item b in any augmented instance Hi is bounded by the degree of b in G
′. In
the case of a top choice item b, the degree of b in G′ is equal to the degree of b
in G1, the graph G restricted to rank-1 edges. Thus, even with the extra copies,
a top choice item remains critical in the augmented graph restricted to rank-1
edges. This implies that for every person, the most preferred even item in the
augmented graph restricted to rank-1 edges (i.e., its s-item) remains unchanged.
We note that the above claim also implies that in every iteration of the while
loop in Step 4 of our algorithm, the size of the maximum cardinality matching
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Algorithm 1 Min-cost augmentation for strict lists of length at most 2.
1: Construct the graph G′ = (A∪B, E′) where E′ = {(a, b) : a ∈ A, b ∈ f(a)∪ s(a)}.
2: H0 = G, H
′
0 = G
′, Let M0 denote a maximum cardinality matching in H
′
0.
3: i = 0.
4: while Mi is not A-complete matching do
5: Partition the vertices into odd (O), even (E), unreachable (U) w.r.t. Mi.
6: Let b denote the cheapest item in B ∩ O.
7: Set copies(b) = copies(b) + 1.
8: Construct the graph H ′i+1 corresponding to Hi+1 and update Mi+1 to be a
maximum cardinality matching in H ′i+1.
9: i = i+ 1.
10: end while
11: Output the graph Hi.
increases by 1, that is, |Mi+1| = |Mi|+ 1. Therefore, the while loop terminates
in k = |A|− |M0| iterations. Since k is bounded by n1, the number of applicants
in G, the running time of our algorithm is O(n21). It is clear that the graph Hi
returned by the algorithm admits an A-complete matching the graph H ′i and
hence admits a popular matching. To see that the instance returned is a min-cost
instance, observe that there is no alternating path between an item b which got
duplicated in our algorithm and an item b′ whose cost is strictly smaller than
the cost(b). Otherwise in the iteration when b was odd, so was b′ and it would
have been picked up by our algorithm.
We can therefore conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The min-cost augmentation problem with strict preference lists of
length at most 2 can be solved in O(n21) time.
4.2 Hardness for the general case
We now show that the min-cost augmentation problem in the general case is
NP-hard. The reduction is again from the monotone 1-in-3 SAT problem (refer
to Section 3). Let I be an instance of the monotone 1-in-3 SAT problem. Let
C1, . . . , Cm be the clauses in I and let X1, . . . , Xn be the variables in I. We
construct from I an instance of the min-cost augmentation problem as follows.
Let Ci be (Xj1 ∨Xj2 ∨Xj3). Corresponding to this clause we have 6 people
Ai = {ai1, ai2, ai3, ai4, ai5, ai6} and 3 internal items Di = {pi, qi, ri}. In addition we
have public items uj1 , uj2 , uj3 which belong to preference lists of people in Ai
and whenever Xj occurs in a clause Ci, the item uj will belong to the preference
lists of some people in Ai. The public items have unit cost whereas each internal
item b ∈ Di has cost 2. The preference lists of the people in Ai are shown in
Fig. 2.
The set B of items is the union of ∪mi=1Di (the set of all the internal items)
and {u1, . . . , un} (consisting of all the public items, where vertex uj corre-
sponds to the j-th variable Xj). The set A of people is the union of ∪mi=1Ai
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ai1 pi uj1 qi
ai2 pi uj2 qi
ai3 pi uj3 qi
ai4 ri uj1
ai5 ri uj2
ai6 ri uj3
Fig. 2. Preference lists of the 6 people in Ai
and {x1, . . . , xn}, where the vertex xj corresponds to the variable Xj . The pref-
erence list of each xj is of length 1, it consists of the item uj.
G has no popular matching. It is easy to see that the graph G described
above does not admit any popular matching. To see this, first note that each
public item uj is a unique rank-1 item for exactly one applicant xj . Hence when
every item has a single copy, these public items are unreachable or critical in G1
(the subgraph of rank-1 edges in G). Now let us consider the people in Ai: for
each ait ∈ {ai1, ai2, ai3}, we have f(ait) = {pi} and s(ait) = {qi}. Since there are
only 2 items pi, qi for the 3 people a
i
1, a
i
2, a
i
3 to be matched to in any popular
matching, G does not admit a popular matching.
Let G˜ be a min-cost instance such that G˜ admits a popular matching. We
now state the following lemma that establishes the reduction.
Lemma 4. G˜ has cost at most m iff there exists a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment
for the instance I.
Proof. Assume that there exists a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment for I. For each j,
let cj denote the number of clauses in which Xj appears. We will set the copies
of the items in the following manner: the copies of the internal items remain the
same, i.e., copies(b) = 1 for each b ∈ ∪iDi and the copies of the public items are
set as follows.
For each j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ n do:
• if Xj = true, then set copies(uj) = 1 + cj
• else copies(uj) remains 1.
Let us determine the cost of this augmentation. For every Xj that is true,
we pay a cost of cj · 1 = cj and for Xj that is false, we pay nothing. Since each
clause has exactly one variable set to true, we have:
∑
j:Xj=true
cj = m. Thus
the cost of our augmentation is m.
We now show that the graph G˜′ admits an A-complete matching (the edges
in G˜′ are (a, b) where b ∈ f(a) ∪ s(a)).
– Consider the people x1, . . . , xn. Each xj gets matched to her f -item uj .
– Consider the people in Ai. We know that exactly one amongst uj1 , uj2 , uj3
has more than one copies (since the number of copies was based on a satis-
fying assignment for 1-in-3 SAT). If copies(ujk) > 1, then a
i
k gets matched
to ujk and the 2 people in {ai1, ai2, ai3} \ {aik} get matched to pi and qi. Fi-
nally, aik+3 gets matched to her top choice item ri whereas the 2 people in
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{ai4, ai5, ai6} \ {aik+3} get matched to their last items (their most preferred
even item in G1).
To prove the other direction, assume that the cost of G˜ ism. We now translate
this into truth values for variables in I. If copies(uj) > 1 in G˜, then set variable
Xj = true, else set Xj = false. We need to show that this is a 1-in-3 satisfying
assignment for I.
Since the cost of adding one copy of any item is at least 1, we need to pay
at least 1 unit per clause in order to match the people in Ai. Thus, we need
to pay at least m to get a graph that admits a popular matching. However, we
are given that with a cost of exactly m, the graph G˜ that admits a popular
matching. Hence, the copies of items have been added such that exactly 1 unit
has been spent per clause.
Spending 1 unit has allowed all the people in Ai, for each i, to have enough
items to match themselves to in G˜′. Consider the items that occur in the pref-
erence lists of people in Ai (refer to Fig. 2). Since the cost of each internal item
is 2 and we cannot afford a cost of 2 for any clause, it has to be the case that
copies(u) > 1 for some u ∈ {uj1 , uj2 , uj3}. Thus, we have at least 1 true variable
per clause in I.
We now have to show that there is exactly 1 true variable per clause in
I. The point to note is that copies(u) > 1 for any public item u implies that
u is non-critical in G˜1. This changes the most preferred even item in G˜1 for
some people. That is, suppose k items in {uj1 , uj2 , uj3} have more than 1 copies.
Then, we have k non-critical items in {uj1 , uj2 , uj3} and so we have k people
in {ai4, ai5, ai6} satisfying the following: a’s most preferred even item in G˜1 is no
longer the last resort item ℓa, it is now the non-critical public item that is second
in a’s preference list.
Observe that one person in {ai4, ai5, ai6} can be matched to her top choice item
ri. However, to match the second person we need to spend another unit. In the
first place, we have already spent 1 unit to add an extra copy of some ujk to match
all the people in {ai1, ai2, ai3}. With more than one item in {uj1 , uj2 , uj3} non-
critical in G˜1, we have pay at least 2 units for the people in Ai. This contradicts
the fact that we spent exactly 1 unit for the people in Ai. Hence there is exactly
1 true variable per clause in I. ⊓⊔
We can now conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 4. The min-cost augmentation problem is NP-hard, even for strict
lists of length at most 3. Further, the lists can be derived from a master list.
4.3 Inapproximability of min-cost augmentation
We extend the above reduction from I to show that this problem is NP-hard to
approximate to within a factor of
√
n1/2, where n1 is the size of A. We construct
a graph H on at most 4m4 people that satisfies the following property:
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(∗) If I is a yes instance for 1-in-3 SAT, then H can be augmented at a cost of
m to admit a popular matching. If I is a no instance for 1-in-3 SAT, then
H needs a cost strictly greater than m3 to admit a popular matching.
We describe the construction of the graph H below. Recall that I has m clauses
and corresponding to each clause Ci, we have a set Ai of people. The construction
of H is as follows. Let us call the group of 3 people (ai4, a
i
5, a
i
6) in Fig. 2 a triplet.
Instead of having just one triplet in Ai, as was the case in the previous section,
here we have many such triplets. In particular, we have m3+1 such triplets. The
preference list for one particular triplet (ai3t+1, a
i
3t+2, a
i
3t+3) is shown in Fig. 3.
ai3t+1 r
t
i uj1
ai3t+2 r
t
i uj2
ai3t+3 r
t
i uj3
Fig. 3. Preference lists of people corresponding to the t-th triplet.
We now have 3 + 3(m3 + 1) people in Ai, namely a
i
1, a
i
2, a
i
3 and 3 people
per triplet, for each of the m3 + 1 triplets. Thus our overall instance H has
m(3 + 3(m3 + 1)) (the people in ∪iAi), plus the n people in {x1, . . . , xn}. Since
each clause has 3 variables, n ≤ 3m. Thus we can bound n1, the number of
people in H as: n1 ≤ 3m4 + 9m ≤ 4m4 for m ≥ 3.
Recall that for each j, the preference list of xj is of length 1, which consists
of only uj . The costs of the items are as follows: the cost of each of the internal
items, i.e., pi, qi, and r
k
i , for k = 1, . . . ,m
3 +1 is m3, and the cost of each uj for
j = 1, . . . , n is 1. We now show that the instance constructed as above satisfies
the property (∗).
Lemma 5. If I is a yes instance for 1-in-3 SAT, then H can be augmented at
a cost of m to admit a popular matching. If I is a no instance for 1-in-3 SAT,
then H needs a cost strictly greater than m3 to admit a popular matching.
Proof. We first consider the case when I is an yes instance. The proof is similar
to that of Lemma 4. For each j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ n, do the following: if Xj = true,
then set copies(uj) = 1 + cj , where cj is the number of clauses in which Xj is
present. Else set copies(uj) = 1. The total cost involved here is
∑
j:Xj=true
cj .
Since each clause has exactly one variable set to true, we have:
∑
j:Xj=true
cj =
m. Thus, the cost of our instance H˜ is m. It is easy to show that the graph H˜ ′
admits an A-complete matching.
– Consider the people x1, . . . , xn. Each xj gets matched to her f -item uj .
– Consider the people in Ai. We know that exactly one amongst uj1 , uj2 , uj3
has more than one copies (since the number of copies was based on a satis-
fying assignment for 1-in-3 SAT). If copies(ujk) > 1, then a
i
k gets matched
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to ujk and the 2 people in {ai1, ai2, ai3} \ {aik} get matched to pi and qi. For
each of the m3 + 1 triplets that we have here, we do as follows. The per-
son ai3t+k gets matched to her top choice item r
t
i whereas the 2 people in
{ai3t+1, ai3t+2, ai3t+3} \ {ai3t+k} get matched to their last items.
This proves that H can be augmented at a cost of exactly m to admit a
popular matching.
We now prove the other direction, that is, if I is a no instance for 1-in-3 SAT,
then H needs a cost of at least m3+1 to admit a popular matching. Suppose H
can be augmented at a cost of at most m3 to admit a popular matching. We will
show that this translates to a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment for I. Let H˜ denote
the augmented graph. Let us set the truth values of variables in I as follows.
Set Xj = true iff copies(uj) in H˜ is greater than 1.
We have only m3 units available to make extra copies so that people in each
set Ai have items in H˜
′ to match themselves to. Recall that the cost of each
internal item is m3. Hence it is easy to see that we cannot afford an extra copy
of any internal item and thus at least one public item in {uj1 , uj2 , uj3} should
have more than one copy to match all of ai1, a
i
2, a
i
3. Otherwise there are only 2
items pi and qi for these 3 people to be matched to; since the first copies of
uj1 , uj2 , uj3 will be matched to xj1 , xj2 , xj3 , respectively. Thus, we have shown
that at least one of uj1 , uj2 , uj3 has more than one copy. Hence in our assignment
of truth values, there is at least 1 variable in each clause that is set to true.
Suppose 2 or more of the items in {uj1 , uj2 , uj3} have more than one copy in
H˜ . We have two people in {ai1, ai2, ai3} having their most preferred even item in
H˜1 as an item in {uj1 , uj2 , uj3}. In addition, in each of the m3 + 1 triplets, two
people have their most preferred even item in {uj1 , uj2 , uj3}. Although, one of
these 2 people from each triplet can be matched to her unique top choice item,
we still need to spend m3 + 1 for all the people in Ai to be matched to items
in H˜ ′. This contradicts the hypothesis that H can be augmented a cost of at
most m3 into H˜ . Hence for each i, there is exactly 1 item in {uj1 , uj2 , uj3} that
has more than one copy in H˜ . In other words, for each i, there is exactly 1 true
variable in the i-th clause. Thus, our assignment is a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment
for I. ⊓⊔
Now suppose that the min-cost augmentation problem admits a
√
n1/2 ap-
proximation algorithm. Call this algorithm Algo1. If I is a yes instance, then
Algo1 has to return an augmentation of cost at most 1/2.
√
4m4.m = m3. If I
is a no instance, then there is no augmentation of cost at most m3, so Algo1
returns an answer of cost greater than m3. Thus using Algo1 it is possible to
determine whether I has a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment or not, a contradiction.
Hence we conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 5. It is NP-hard to approximate the min-cost augmentation problem
on G = (A ∪ B, E) within √|A|/2.
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4.4 Perfect augmentation
In this section we consider a variant of the min-cost augmentation problem where
we are not content with only a popular matching, but insist on every applicant
being matched to an item. Note that till now we allowed people to be matched
to their last items which was equivalent to leaving them unmatched. We call
a popular matching that matches all the people as a perfect popular matching
and denote the problem as min-cost perfect augmentation. We show that this
problem becomes NP-hard even when preference lists are strict and have length
at most 2 in contrast to the min-cost augmentation problem which has a simple
polynomial time algorithm for strict lists of length at most 2.
The overall reduction is similar to the min-cost augmentation problem where
we reduce from an instance I of monotone 1-in-3 SAT problem. As earlier,
corresponding to every variable Xj in I we have an applicant xj in our instance.
The preference list of applicant xj contains only one item uj . Let Ci = (Xj1 ∨
Xj2 ∨ Xj3) be a clause in I. Corresponding to clause Ci we have a set of 6
people Ai = {ai1, . . . , ai6} and a set of internal items Di = {pi, qi}. The internal
items appear on preference lists of people only in Ai. In addition public items
uj1 , uj2 , uj3 also appear on the preference lists of people in Ai. The preference
lists of people are as shown in Fig. 4.
ai1 pi uj1
ai2 pi uj2
ai3 pi uj3
ai4 uj1 qi
ai5 uj2 qi
ai6 uj3 qi
Fig. 4. Preference lists of the 6 people in Ai
We define the sets A and B below.
A = ∪mi=1Ai ∪ {x1, . . . , xn}.
B = ∪mi=1Di ∪ {u1, . . . , un}.
The graph G = (A ∪ B, E) with the preference lists as defined above is our
instance G. It remains to describe the costs of items in G. The cost of every
public item uj is 1 whereas the costs of every internal item is m. With a single
copy of every item, all public items are critical in the graph G1. Hence people
ai1, a
i
2, a
i
3 belonging to Ai treat their unique last resort items as their s-items.
Further people ai4, a
i
5, a
i
6 treat the internal item qi as their s-item. It is easy to
verify that the graph G described above does not admit a popular matching.
Let G˜ be an augmented instance that admits a perfect popular matching.
In any perfect popular matching in G˜ every applicant xj has to be matched to
her f -item i.e. uj . Now let us consider the people in Ai. Since the internal items
are of cost m each and public items have cost 1, it is cheaper to make extra
copies of public items. Further, recall that any popular matching has to be a
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maximum cardinality matching on rank-1 edges. Therefore in order to match
one of {ai1, ai2, ai3} (say ai1) to its s-item uj1 , we need to make 2 extra copies
of uj1 thus making uj1 non-critical in G˜1. This ensures that applicant a
i
4 gets
matched to a copy of uj1 , her f -item. It is easy to see that in order to get a
perfect popular matching, we need to make at least two public items non-critical
in the graph G˜. Thus we spend an amount of at least 4 units per clause in any
augmented instance G˜ that admits a perfect popular matching.
We now show the following lemma which proves the correctness of our re-
duction.
Lemma 6. The min-cost instance G˜ corresponding to G that admits a perfect
popular matching has cost 4m iff there exists a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment for
I.
Proof. Assume that there exists a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment for I and let
Truthval denote the 1-in-3 satisfying assignment for I. For every variable Xj ,
let cj denote the number of clauses in which Xj appears. We set the copies of
the items in G˜ as follows: If Truthval(Xj) = false, then copies(uj) = 2cj + 1,
otherwise copies(uj) = 1. Thus we pay 2cj units for the extra copies of item uj
whenever the corresponding variable Xj is set to false.
Since I has a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment, each clause has exactly two vari-
ables set to false. We therefore have:
∑
j:Truthval(Xj)=false
2cj = 4m.
Thus the cost of our instance G˜ is 4m. We now show that in the graph G˜, every
applicant has an item to match amongst her f or s items.
– Consider the people x1, x2, . . . , xn. Each xj gets matched to her f -item uj.
– Consider the people in Ai corresponding to the clause Ci = (Xj1∨Xj2∨Xj3).
We know that exactly two among uj1 , uj2 , uj3 are non-critical. Assume that
uj1 and uj2 are non-critical, then people a
i
1 and a
i
2 get matched to their
s-items uj1 and uj2 respectively. Further a
i
4 and a
i
5 get matched to their
f -items uj1 and uj2 respectively. Finally, a
i
3 gets matched to her f -item pi
whereas ai6 gets matched to her s-item qi.
To prove the other direction, assume that G˜ admits a popular matching and
has cost 4m. We now translate this into the truth values for variables in I. If
copies(uj) > 1 in G˜, then set variable Xj = false else set Xj = true. We need
to show that this assignment is a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment.
Recall that for every clause we need to spend at least 4 units in order to
match all the people in Ai. Since the cost of G˜ is 4m, this implies that exactly
4 units have been spent per clause for making extra copies.
Now consider the people in Ai. The internal items occurring on their prefer-
ence lists of these people have costm each, hence none of the internal items have
extra copies in the augmented instance. This implies that at least 2 public items
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amongst {uj1 , uj2 , uj3} have more than one copy in the augmented instance.
Thus our truth assignment sets at least 2 variables to false. It remains to prove
that for every clause exactly 2 variables are set to false. Assume not.
Let Ci be a clause in which our truth assignment set all the three variables
Xj1 , Xj2 , Xj3 to false. This implies that in the instance G˜ all the three public
items uj1 , uj2 , uj3 have more than one copy. The first copy of these public items
is utilized in matching people xj1 , xj2 , xj3 respectively to their f -items. Further
since any popular matching is a maximum cardinality matching on rank-1 edges,
the second copies of these items will have to be assigned to people ai4, a
i
5, a
i
6. Thus
after spending 3 units we are still left with 2 people amongst {ai1, ai2, ai3} without
any item. Hence we need to spend 2 more units to match 2 of these people, which
implies that we spent 3+2=5 units for people in Ai. This contradicts the fact
that exactly 4 units was spent in order to match people in Ai, for all i. Thus
exactly one variable in every clause is set to true. ⊓⊔
The following theorem is immediate from the above lemma.
Theorem 6. The min-cost perfect augmentation problem is NP-hard for strict
lists of length at most 2.
5 Min-cost Popular matchings
In this section we present an O(mn1) time algorithm for the min-cost popular
matchings problem, where m = |E| and n1 = |A|. Our input is an instance
G = (A ∪ B, E) where each item b ∈ B has associated with it the number
copies(b) (denoting the maximum number of people that can be matched to b)
and a price cost(b) ≥ 0. Whenever a person gets matched to b, an amount of
cost(b) has to be paid. Thus if k ≤ copies(b) copies of b gets used in a matching
M , then a cost of k ·cost(b) has to be paid by M . As done in the earlier sections,
we will add a last item ℓa at the end of a’s preference list for each person a ∈ A.
The cost of ℓa is 0, since using the edge (a, ℓa) amounts to leaving a unmatched.
Our problem here is to decide whether G admits a popular matching or not
and if so, to compute the one with minimum cost. As mentioned in Section 1,
Manlove and Sng considered the popular matchings problem (referred to as the
CHAT problem) where items (these were called houses) have capacities and they
showed an O((
√
C + n1)m) algorithm for this problem, where C is the sum of
all the capacities.
In order to solve the min-cost popular matchings problem, for each b ∈ B,
we could make copies(b) copies of each vertex b, call them b1, . . . , bcopies(b), where
each bi has the same neighborhood as the original vertex b. However, such a
graph has too many vertices and edges, hence we will stick to the original graph
G = (A ∪ B, E) and simulate the larger graph in G itself. Note that a matching
in G can contain up to copies(b) pairs (ai, b). It is easy to see that the structural
characterization for popular matchings from [2] holds for our problem as well.
That is, any popular matching in our graph G has to be a maximum cardinality
matching on rank-1 edges and every person a has to be matched to an item in
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f(a)∪ s(a). This is because by making copies(b) many duplicates of every item b
in G our problem becomes equivalent to the original popular matchings problem.
5.1 Our algorithm
Our algorithm to compute a min-cost popular matching can be broadly parti-
tioned into two stages. In the first stage we build the graph G′, i.e. the graph
where every person adds edges to their f and s-items. Identifying s-items for
people involves partitioning the vertices of G into odd, even and unreachable
with respect to a maximum cardinality matching on rank-1 edges. We show how
to efficiently do this by building Hungarian trees rooted at unmatched vertices.
The second stage then computes a min-cost popular matching in the graph G′
if one exists.
The first stage. We first construct the graphG1 which is the graphG restricted
to rank-1 edges. In order to find a maximum cardinality matching in the graph
G1, we use Ford-Fulkerson max-flow algorithm. The following transformation
from G1 into a flow network is based on the standard transformation from the
bipartite matching problem to the maximum flow problem:
– add a vertex s and an edge directed from s to each person a ∈ A with an
edge capacity of 1 on this edge.
– add a vertex t and an edge directed from each item b ∈ B to t with an edge
capacity of copies(b) on this edge.
– direct every edge (a, b) of G from a to b and set an edge capacity of 1 for
each such edge.
Let F (G1) denote the above graph. It is easy to see that a valid flow from s
to t in the graph F (G1) can be translated to a matching in G1 in which every
person is matched to at most 1 item and every item b is matched up to copies(b)
people. A maximum flow in F (G1) becomes a maximum cardinality matching
in G1. We compute a maximum cardinality matching M0 of G1 by computing a
max-flow from s to t in F (G1). Using the matching M0, our goal is to obtain a
partition of A∪B into O (odd), E (even) and U (unreachable). This can be done
in O(number of edges) provided we create copies(b) many duplicates of each item
p and duplicate the neighborhood of b for each copy of b. However this is too
expensive. The main point to note is that all the copies(b) many copies of b, for
each item b, have the same odd/even/unreachable status. We show below that
we can remain in the graph G1 and determine the odd/even/unreachable status
of all the vertices in linear time.
1. We begin with O = E = U = ∅.
2. We then add to the set E all people that are unmatched in M0 and all items
that are not fully matched byM0 (i.e. a item b that is matched to fewer than
copies(b) many people). This is because if we would have made copies(b) many
duplicates of b, some of the copies would have remained unmatched by M0
and the other copies which are matched would be connected by even length
alternating paths from these unmatched vertices.
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3. Our goal now is to build a Hungarian tree Tu for each vertex u that is
unmatched or not fully in M0. In order to do so we first set all vertices as
unmarked. We build the trees rooted at unmatched people and not fully
matched items as described below:
(a) For u ∈ A that is unmatched, the children of u in Tu are all the neigh-
boring items of u that are unmarked so far. For each of these items b
the children of b in Tu are all the unmarked people matched to b. The
children of these people are their neighboring unmarked items and so on.
As soon as a vertex gets visited in Tu we mark it.
(b) For u ∈ B the children of u are all the neighboring unmarked people of
u. Note that some of these people could be matched to u – however, we
will include all these people since we are simulating the Hungarian tree
rooted at an unmatched copy of u. We mark each person in this child
list.
Each person a in the above child list had a unique child, the item to
which a is matched. If this item is marked, then a is a leaf in this tree,
else we add M0(a) to the tree and mark it. We now continue to explore
the unmarked neighborhood of M0(a) for all non-leaf people a.
(c) Once Tu is built, all vertices that belong to even levels of Tu (the root is
at level 0) are added to E and all vertices that belong to odd levels are
added to O.
4. Once we finish building all the trees Tu, where u is unmatched person/not
a fully matched item, the set U gets set to the vertices of A ∪ B \ O ∪ E as
there is no alternating path from an unmatched vertex to such vertices.
We note that while building a tree Tu, we explore the neighborhood of a
vertex only if this vertex is unmarked and then this vertex immediately gets
marked. This ensures that a vertex occurs just once across all Tu’s. Having
obtained the partition, it is now possible to define s(a) for every person a as the
most preferred even item of a. Let the graph G′ be the graph G1 along with the
edges (a, b) where a ∈ E and p ∈ s(a).
Since a popular matching is a maximum cardinality matching on rank-1
edges, all items that are critical in G1, that is, all items in O ∪ U have to be
fully matched in every popular matching M∗ of G. The only choice we have
is in choosing which items of E should participate with how many copies in
the min-cost popular matching. We make this choice in the second stage of our
algorithm.
The second stage. Our goal in the second part of the algorithm is to augment
the matching M0 to find a min-cost popular matching. However, we start with
the matching M1, where M1 = M0 \ {all edges (a, b) where a ∈ O}. Thus M1
consists only of edges (a, b) where b ∈ O ∪ U . We take M1 to be our starting
matching rather than M0 because it may be possible to match people O ∩ A
to cheaper rank-1 neighbors. Recall that while computing the max-flow M0, the
costs of items played no role.
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Now let ρ be an augmenting path with respect to M1, i.e., one end of ρ is an
unmatched person and the other end of ρ is item b that is not fully matched. The
cost of augmenting the current matching along ρ is the cost of b. By augmenting
the current matching along ρ, every item other than b that is currently matched
stays matched to the same number of people and the item b gets matched to one
more person. Thus the cost of the new matching is the cost of the old matching +
cost(b). In order to match an unmatched person a, our algorithm always chooses
the cheapest augmenting path starting from the person a.
To find the cheapest augmenting path we build a Hungarian tree Ta rooted
at every person that is unmatched in M1. Initially all vertices are unmarked and
while building Ta every visited vertex gets marked so that each vertex occurs
at most once in Ta. We do not terminate the construction of Ta as soon as we
find an augmenting path, but we build Ta completely in order to find a min-cost
item b such that there is an augmenting path between and a and b; we augment
M1 along this path to obtain M2. On the other hand if Ta has no augmenting
path then we quit and declare “G does not admit a popular matching”.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm for min-cost popular matching.
1: Construct the graph G1 = (A∪ B, E1) where E1 = {(a, b) : a ∈ A, b ∈ f(a)}.
2: Construct the flow graph F (G1) by adding two vertices s and t and adding directed
edges with appropriate capacities.
3: Compute a maximum flow in F (G1) and translate the flow to a matching M0 in
G1.
4: Obtain a partition of the vertices of G as odd (O) , even (E) and unreachable (U)
using M0.
5: Construct the graph G′ = (A∪B, E′) where every person adds edges to her f -items
and every even person adds edges to her s-items.
6: Delete from G′ all OO and OU edges.
7: Delete from M0 all edges that are incident on odd people in G
′ and call the resulting
matching M1.
8: i = 1.
9: while there exists an unmatched person a in Mi do
10: Build a Hungarian tree Ta rooted at a.
11: if there exists no augmenting path starting at a then
12: Quit and declare “G does not admit any popular matching”.
13: else
14: Augment Mi along the cheapest augmenting path in Ta and call the new
matching Mi+1.
15: end if
16: i = i+ 1.
17: end while
18: Return Mi.
We present our entire algorithm in Algorithm 2. To see the correctness of
the algorithm we first note that if there is no augmenting path in Ta, where a
is an unmatched person in Mi, then there is no popular matching in G. This is
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because every popular matching is a maximum cardinality matching on rank-1
edges and has to match every a ∈ A to a item in f(a)∪ s(a). It remains to prove
that if G admits a popular matching, then the matching M(= Mi) returned at
Step 18 of Algorithm 2 is a min-cost popular matching. We prove that using
Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. If G admits a popular matching, then the matching M returned by
our algorithm is a min-cost popular matching in G.
Proof. SupposeM is not a min-cost popular matching in G and let OPT be such
a matching. For the purpose of this proof we operate on the cloned graph where
each item b has copies(b) many copies and M and OPT both refer to matchings
where each item is matched to at most one person. Consider OPT⊕M - this is
a collection of cycles and even length alternating paths (since both OPT and M
are A-complete). The cycles do not contribute to any change in costs since both
OPT and M match the same items in any cycle.
Let ρ be a path in OPT ⊕M . Let β0 and βM be the endpoints of this path,
where OPT leaves βM unmatched while M leaves β0 unmatched. It suffices to
show that cost(βM ) ≤ cost(β0). Since OPT is a popular matching, it has to
match all the items in O∪U (the odd/unreachable items in G1). Since it leaves
βM unmatched, it follows that βM ∈ E and thus there are items of E in ρ.
It is the second stage of our algorithm that matches items in E . Let α1 be the
last person in the path ρ to get matched by our algorithm and let M(α1) = β1.
Since β0 is unmatched inM it implies that during the execution of our algorithm
we found at least two augmenting paths from α1 – one ending in β1 and the other
ending in β0. Further, we found the augmenting path ending in β1 cheaper, that
is, cost(β1) ≤ cost(β0).
We now repeat the same argument for the β1-βM sub-path of ρ. Let α2 be
the last person in the β1-βM sub-path that got matched by our algorithm and
let M(α2) = β2. Note that β1 was also unmatched at this time and hence our
algorithm found at least two augmenting paths from α2 – one ending in β1 and
another ending in β2. Since M(α2) = β2 it implies that cost(β2) ≤ cost(β1).
Repeating the same argument for the β2-βM sub-path we get vertices β3, . . . , βt =
βM where cost(β2) ≤ cost(β3) ≤ · · · ≤ cost(βt). Combining all the inequalities
yields cost(βM ) ≤ cost(β0). ⊓⊔
Time complexity of this algorithm. The difference between our algorithm and
that of Manlove and Sng for the CHAT problem in the first stage is that they
use Gabow’s algorithm to find a matching on rank-1 edges whereas we use Ford-
Fulkerson max-flow algorithm. Gabow’s algorithm runs in time O(
√
Cm) where
C =
∑|B|
i=1 copies(bi) whereas since the value of max-flow in the graph F (G1) is
upper bounded by |A| = n1, Ford-Fulkerson algorithm takes O(mn1) time. Also,
the total time taken by our algorithm to partition vertices into O, E , and U is
O(m + n) where n denotes the total number of vertices in G. It is easy to see
that the time spent by our algorithm in the second stage is also O(mn1) since
it takes O(m) time to build the tree Ta and there are at most n1 such trees that
we build. We can now conclude the following theorem.
22
Theorem 7. There exists an O(mn1) time algorithm to decide whether a given
instance G of the min-cost popular matchings problem admits a popular matching
and if so, to compute one with min-cost.
Note that by assigning a huge cost Cˆ >
∑
b copies(b).cost(b) to each of the
last items ℓa, a ∈ A that we introduced, our algorithm also works for the min-
cost maximum-cardinality popular matching problem where we seek among all
popular matchings of maximum cardinality, the one with minimum cost.
Conclusions
In this paper we considered several extensions of the popular matching problem.
We showed that the min-cost popular instance problem, which involves building
a min-cost graph that admits a popular matching that matches all applicants,
is NP-hard, even when preference lists are strict and of length at most 2. In
contrast, the min-cost augmentation problem admits a simple polynomial time
algorithm when preference lists are strict and of length at most 2. However,
the min-cost augmentation problem is NP-hard in general; it is NP-hard even
when preference lists are strict and of length at most 3. In fact, it is NP-hard to
approximate the min-cost augmentation problem to within a factor of
√
n1/2,
where n1 is the number of people. We also showed that the min-cost popular
matching problem (the number of copies of each item is fixed here) can be solved
in O(mn1) time, where m is the number of edges in the input graph.
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